Hughes’ employment commenced on 1 June 2011. On 6 September he was told that he had failed his
probationary period and he was given 1 month’s notice, which expired on 5 October. Hughes lodged an unfair
dismissal complaint in the Tribunal. He also claimed wrongful dismissal, on the basis that he should have been
given three months’ notice rather than one month. The unfair dismissal complaint was struck out by the
Tribunal on the basis that he had not completed 26 weeks’ continuous employment and therefore had no
protection from unfair dismissal.
Hughes appealed to the Royal Court saying that contractually he was entitled to three months’ notice. Given Article 63(2), he argued that he was entitled to claim unfair dismissal as had he received the notice to which he
said he was contractually entitled he would have had the requisite period of continuous employment to bring
such a claim.
Article 63(2) states:
“Where –
(a) the contract of employment is terminated by the employer; and
(b) the notice required by Article 56 to be given by an employer would, if duly given on the material
date, expire on a date later than the effective date of termination,
for the purposes of Article 73 the later date shall be the effective date of termination.”
The Royal Court dismissed the appeal. It was clear that the employee had received more than the statutory
minimum notice entitlement required by Article 56 and therefore Article 63(2) did not come into play.
The employment had come to an end on 5 October, which was the effective date of termination for the
purposes of Article 73. He had therefore not been continuously employed for at least 26 weeks and the
Tribunal had correctly struck out the unfair dismissal claim.
Jurisdiction and the “child of God”
Having had no appeals from the Tribunal to the Royal Court for some years, in 2012 there were two, the
Hughes case (see previous) and In the matter of the application of Darius Pearce [20120JRC217. The latter
was an application to the Royal Court for leave to appeal a decision of the Tribunal.
Mr Pearce declined to lodge a response to the claim against him, on the basis that he had never been the
employer of the individual in question (Miss Garcia). An interim hearing was held by the Tribunal at which the
respondent did not attend. Evidence provided at the hearing by Miss Garcia included a letter from the
respondent in which he had written to Social Security saying:
“…I have offered employment to Miss Garcia on a full time basis commencing on the 23rd May 2011…”
The Tribunal held that Mr Pearce was Miss Garcia’s former employer and declined an application for leave to
appeal. That application was renewed before the Royal Court, which noted that, inter alia:
“Mr Pearce challenged the jurisdiction of the Tribunal on a number of grounds including that he was not
“a member of the Island of Jersey and its dependencies” and therefore he was not subject to its rules
and regulations. To become subject to such rules and regulations required, he said, a voluntary act on
his part. He told me it was for this reason that he had not attended the hearings as to do so would have
given the Tribunal jurisdiction over him. He had attended the application for leave as “a child of God”
whose jurisdiction was the only one he recognised. At the same time he confirmed that he lived in Jersey.”
The Commissioner upheld the Tribunal’s decision to refuse leave to appeal, given that the appeal had no
prospect of success.